Charles De Gaulle

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Charles de Gaulle Facts 1. Charles de Gaulle was a German prisoner of war During World War I, Charles de Gaulle had been in the army for a mere 2 years. Charles de Gaulle was born in Lille on 22 November 1890 and grew up in Paris, where his father was a teacher. De Gaulle chose a military career and served with distinction in World War One.
Charles-Andr-Joseph-Marie de Gaulle (22 November1890 9 November1970), in France commonly referred to as le gnral de Gaulle , was a French military leader and statesman. During World War II, he reached the rank of Brigade General and then became the leader of the Forces Franaises Libres ('FFL' the 'Free French Forces'). Between 1944 and 1946, following the liberation of France from German occupation, he was head of the French provisional government. Called to form a government in 1958, he inspired a new constitution and was the Fifth Republic's first president, serving from 1958 to 1969. Quotations [ edit ] France cannot be France without greatness. 1930s [ edit ] All my life, I have had a certain idea of France. Le Fil de l'pe (1932) [ edit ] Charles de Gaulle with Winston Churchill
Nothing builds authority up like silence, splendor of the strong and shelter of the weak.
Rien ne rehausse l'autorit mieux que le silence, splendeur des forts et refuge des faibles.
It is better to have a bad method than to have none.
Il vaut mieux avoir une mthode mauvaise plutt que de n'en avoir aucune.
Character is the virtue of hard times.
Le caractre, vertu des temps difficiles. Vers larme de mtier (1934) [ edit ]
The sword is the axis of the world and grandeur cannot be divided.
L'pe est l'axe du monde et la grandeur ne se divise pas.
Nothing great is done without great men, and they are great because they wanted it.
On ne fait rien de grand sans de grands hommes, et ceux-ci le sont pour l'avoir voulu. La France et son arme (1938) [ edit ]
France was built with swords. The fleur-de-lis, symbol of national unity, is only the image of a spear with three pikes.
La France fut faite coups d'pe. La fleur de lys, symbole d'unit nationale, n'est que l'image d'un javelot trois lances.
The desire of privilege and the taste of equality are the dominant and contradictory passions of the French of all times.
Le dsir du privilge et le got de l'galit, passions dominantes et contradictoires des Franais de toute poque. 1940s [ edit ]
France has lost a battle, but France has not lost the war.
La France a perdu une bataille, mais la France n'a pas perdu la guerre.
Poster tous les Franais (To All Frenchmen), 3 August 1940.
tous les Franais was designed and displayed in London to accompany the Appel du 18 juin (Appeal of 18 June) following defeat at the Battle of France. The pair are considered to be the founding texts of the Rsistance .
At the root of our civilization, there is the freedom of each person of thought, of belief, of opinion, of work, of leisure.
A la base de notre civilisation, il y a la libert de chacun dans sa pense, ses croyances, ses opinions, son travail, ses loisirs.
Speech, November 25 1941. Quoted in de Gaulle: 'La France n'a pas perdu la guerre: discours et messages', pg 114
Let us be firm, pure and faithful; at the end of our sorrow, there is the greatest glory of the world, that of the men who did not give in.
Soyons fermes, purs et fidles ; au bout de nos peines, il y a la plus grande gloire du monde, celle des hommes qui n'ont pas cd.
Speech, July 14 1943.
I am retiring. I have a mission, and it is coming to an end France may still one day need an image that is pure. She must be left this image. If Joan of Arc had married, she would no longer have been Joan of Arc.
Said to Pierre Bertaux in 1944, as recounted in The Atlantic , November 1960.
It is unnecessary, for the Republic has never ceased to exist. I was the Republic.
Reply in August 1944 to a statement of regret that the windows of the Hotel de Ville in Paris were not opened for the crowd outside cheering the reestablishment of the Republic. Quoted in The Atlantic , November 1960.
Now she is like the others.
Maintenant, elle est comme les autres.
Spoken at the funeral of his daughter Anne, who had Down Syndrome, February 1948. Quoted in De Gaulle by Julian Jackson Appeal of June 18 [ edit ] Background Information [ edit ]
General de Gaulle was the de facto leader of the Free French Forces which had escaped to London in World War II. Marshal Henri Philippe Ptain, a hero of world War I, had signed an armistice (agreement to end fighting) with the invading forces of Nazi Germany, and led the Nazi-collaborating government of Vichy France in the south. The Nazis had occupied the north of France. De Gaulle was opposed to surrender and had left France on June 15, 1940 after Ptain made clear he wanted to do so.
Three days later, de Gaulle obtained special permission from Winston Churchill to broadcast a speech via BBC Radio over France, despite the British Cabinet's efforts to block the broadcast. In the speech, de Gaulle reminded the French people that the British Empire and the United States of America would support them in an effort to retake their land from the Nazis. On June 18, 1940, at 19:00, de Gaulle's voice was broadcast nationwide. Speech of June 18 [ edit ] 'The leaders who, for many years, were at the head of French armies, have formed a government. This government, alleging our armies to be undone, agreed with the enemy to stop fighting. Of course, we were subdued by the mechanical, ground and air forces of the enemy. Infinitely more than their number, it was the tanks, the airplanes, the tactics of the Germans which made us retreat. It was the tanks, the airplanes, the tactics of the Germans that surprised our leaders to the point to bring them there where they are today. 'But has the last word been said? Must hope disappear? Is defeat final? No! 'Believe me, I speak to you with full knowledge of the facts and tell you that nothing is lost for France. The same means that overcame us can bring us to a day of victory. For France is not alone! She is not alone! She is not alone! She has a vast Empire behind her. She can align with the British Empire that holds the sea and continues the fight. She can, like England, use without limit the immense industry of United States. 'This war is not limited to the unfortunate territory of our country. This war is not finished by the battle of France. This war is a world-wide war. All the faults, all the delays, all the suffering, do not prevent there to be, in the world, all the necessary means to one day crush our enemies. Vanquished today by mechanical force, we will be able to overcome in the future by a superior mechanical force. 'The destiny of the world is here. I, General de Gaulle, currently in London, invite the officers and the French soldiers who are located in British territory or who would come there, with their weapons or without their weapons, I invite the engineers and the special workers of armament industries who are located in British territory or who would come there, to put themselves in contact with me. 'Whatever happens, the flame of the French resistance must not be extinguished and will not be extinguished. Tomorrow, as today, I will speak on Radio London.' 1950s [ edit ]
A foreign military leader whose daring was feared by those who profited by it.
On General Douglas MacArthur (1951). De Gaulle said MacArthur's critics should 'pay deserved tribute to the legendary service of a great soldier'. Quoted in American Caesar by William Manchester.
All my life, I have had a certain idea of France.
Toute ma vie, je me suis fait une certaine ide de la France.
Opening sentence of his Mmoires de guerre (1954).
Politics, when it is an art and a service, not an exploitation, is about acting for an ideal through realities.
La politique, quand elle est un art et un service, non point une exploitation, c'est une action pour un idal travers des ralits.
Press conference, June 30 1955. Quoted in 'Le Gnral de Gaulle et la construction de l'Europe' (1967), pg 33.
I am a man who belongs to no-one and who belongs to everyone.
Je suis un homme qui n'appartient personne et qui appartient tout le monde.
Press conference, 19 May 1958. Quoted in 'Carnets secrets de la politique' (1958) by Jean Raymond Tournoux.
Why do you think that at 67 I would start a career as a dictator ?
Pourquoi voulez-vous qu' 67 ans je commence une carrire de dictateur ?
Press conference, 19 May 1958. De Gaulle was changing the constitution to make government more efficient, after decades of impotent parliamentary regime, and he mocked journalists who claimed he was establishing a dictatorship.
I have understood you!
Je vous ai compris !
Said before the population of Algiers after they had called upon him to take power, June 4, 1958.
'in the whole of Algeria there is only category of inhabitant: there are none here but fully-fledged Frenchmen, fully-fledged Frenchmen with the same rights and the same duties.'
Yes, it is Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals , it is Europe, it is the whole of Europe, that will decide the fate of the world.
Oui, c'est l'Europe, depuis l'Atlantique jusqu' l'Oural, c'est toute l'Europe, qui dcidera du destin du monde.
23 November 1959, Strasbourg. The phrase shown in bold is the most often quoted excerpt. De Gaulle was expressing his vision of Europe's future. Mmoires de guerre (1954, 1956, 1959) [ edit ] Charles de Gaulle with Rt. Hon. W.L. Mackenzie King
Anything can happen someday, even that an act conforming to honour and honesty can end up, at the end of the line, as a good political decision.
Tout peut, un jour, arriver, mme qu'un acte conforme l'honneur et l'honntet apparaisse en fin de compte, comme un bon placement politique.
The leader is always alone before bad fates.
Toujours le chef est seul en face du mauvais destin.
Difficulty attracts a man of character, for it is by embracing it that he fulfils himself.
La difficult attire l'homme de caractre, car c'est en l'treignant qu'il se ralise lui-mme.
The cabinet has no propositions to make, but orders to give.
Le gouvernement n'a pas de propositions faire, mais des ordres donner.
Secretary of State De Gaulle so replied, in early June 1940, to Admiral Darlan, whom he was asking to transfer what was left of the French army to North Africa
France cannot be France without greatness.
La France ne peut tre la France sans la grandeur. 1960s [ edit ]
No policy is worth anything outside of reality.
Il n'y a pas de politique qui vaille en dehors des ralits.
Televised speech, June 14 1960
How can you govern a country that has two hundred and forty-six varieties of cheese?
Comment voulez-vous gouverner un pays qui a deux cent quarante-six varits de fromage?
Les Mots du Gnral, Ernest Mignon, 1962
So, it is true that ones homeland is entirely human, emotional and that it is the root of action, of authority, of responsibility from which one can build Europe. What elements? Well, [nation] States, because only States are valid, are legitimate, in this respect, in addition they are capable of As I have already said and I repeat, that at the present time, there cannot be any other Europe than that of the States, apart of course from myths, fictions, parades. From this solidarity depends all hope of uniting Europe in the political field and in the field of defense, as in the economic field. From this solidarity depends, therefore, the destiny of Europe as a whole, from the Atlantic to the Urals.
Alors, il est vrai que la Patrie est un lment humain, sentimental et que cest sur des lments daction, dautorit, de responsabilit quon peut construire lEurope. Quels lments? Eh bien, les tats, car il ny a que les tats qui, cet gard, soient valables, soient lgitimes et en outre soient capables de raliser Jai dj dit et je rpte, qu lheure quil est, il ne peut pas y avoir dautre Europe possible que celle des tats, en dehors naturellement des mythes, des fictions, des parades. De cette solidarit dpend tout espoir dunir lEurope dans le domaine politique et dans le domaine de la dfense, comme dans le domaine conomique. De cette solidarit dpend, par consquent, le destin de lEurope tout entire, depuis lAtlantique jusqu lOural.
Press conference, Elyse Palace, Paris, 15 May 1962
I am not ill. But do not worry, one day, I will certainly die.
Je ne vais pas mal. Mais rassurez-vous, un jour, je ne manquerai pas de mourir.
Press conference, February 1965, denying rumours that he secretly had a terminal disease
Of course one can jump up and down yelling Europe ! Europe ! Europe ! But it amounts to nothing and it means nothing.
Bien entendu, on peut sauter sur sa chaise comme un cabri en disant lEurope ! lEurope ! lEurope ! mais cela naboutit rien et cela ne signifie rien.
Interview on a presidential campaign, December 1965 INA archive of the video (De Gaulle meant that he wanted to build a European Union on realities, i.e. the existing nation-states with their respective interests not on slogans and abstractions)
Long live Montreal, Long live Quebec! Long live free Quebec!
Vive Montreal; Vive le Qubec! Vive le Qubec libre!
Said in 1967 on the balcony of Montral City Hall, [ citation needed ] , with particular emphasis on the word 'libre'. The phrase, a slogan used by Quebecers who favoured Quebec sovereignty, and de Gaulle's use of it, was seen by them as lending his tacit support to the Quebec sovereignty movement. The speech sparked a diplomatic incident with Canada's government, and was condemned by Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, who said 'Canadians do not need to be liberated.' Charles De Gaulle Airport
The future does not belong to men...
L'avenir n'appartient pas aux hommes...
Speech, December 1967
Patriotism is when love of your own people comes first; nationalism, when hate for people other than your own comes first.
Attributed to de Gaulle by Romain Gary, Life , May 9, 1969 Undated [ edit ]
Men may have friends, statesmen cannot.
Les hommes peuvent avoir des amis, pas les hommes d'Etat.
Quoted in Les trois views de Charles de Gaulle by David Schoenbrun (1965)
When we were children, we often played war. We had a fine collection of lead soldiers. My brothers would take different countries: Xavier had Italy; Pierre, Germany. Or they would swap around. Well, I, gentlemen, always had France.
Reminiscing during an ocean voyage to Tahiti, quoted in The Atlantic , November 1960.
'Do you know that you have caused us more trouble than all the rest of our European allies?' 'I do not doubt it. France is a great power.'
Conversation with Anthony Eden, recounted in de Gaulle's Mmoires de guerre . Quoted in The Atlantic , November 1960.
Within ten years, we shall have the means to kill 80 million Russians. I truly believe that one does not light-heartedly attack people who are able to kill 80 million Russians, even if one can kill 800 million French, that is if there were 800 million French.
Discussing the Force de Frappe. Quoted in The New York Review of Books , 29 April 2010.
Jews remain what they have been at all times: an elite people, self-confident and domineering.
Attributed to a news conference (27 November 1967) the earliest occurrence of this statement yet located is in The Cross and the Flag , Vol. 27, (1968) by the Christian Nationalist Crusade Misattributed [ edit ]
I am Joan of Arc. I am Clemenceau.
Reportedly misattributed by Franklin Delano Roosevelt in January, 1943, in communicating his impression of de Gaulle's arrogance in assuming the mantle of leadership of free France. Reported in Paul F. Boller, John George, They Never Said It: A Book of Fake Quotes, Misquotes, and Misleading Attributions (1990), p. 33-34.
The evolution toward Communism is inevitable.
Reported in the National Review (November 1962) as a misattribution created by extreme rightists. See Paul F. Boller, John George, They Never Said It: A Book of Fake Quotes, Misquotes, and Misleading Attributions (1990), p. 33. Quotations about de Gaulle [ edit ]
Leahy also watched with dismay as General de Gaulle's militant supporters eclipsed the leaders Leahy believed had the real interests of France at heart. De Gaulle, who had now taken the Cross of Lorraine as his personal symbol, was too ruthless to fail.
Henry H. Adams, Witness to Power: The Life of Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy (1985), p. 237
Leahy was by no means ready to accept the tall, vainglorious Frenchman as the natural leader of French interests. In common with most of his staff who had been with him in Vichy, he distrusted de Gaulle and his French Committee of National Liberation (FCNL). As early as the previous September, Leahy had expressed his views to friends in the State Department, and 'Doc' Matthews had sent him a collection of letters and reports from Murphy and others naming chapter and verse of how de Gaulle and his followers had consistently undercut Giraud. Leahy had no particular brief for Giraud, but he was the one recognized by the British and Americans as French military leader in the Mediterranean. For the same reason de Gaulle had been kept in the dark before Torch- because his headquarters could not keep a secret- Giraud concealed from the FCNL his invasion of Corsica in September until just before the landings. De Gaulle's response was to use the FCNL, which he now dominated, to deprive 'the French Commander-in-Chief of the authority and freedom of action which both he and our own military leaders have felt was essential. Such behavior, Leahy felt, was all of a piece with what was to be expected from Charles de Gaulle and his Free French. There was no living with de Gaulle, but because of decisions made by Churchill and FDR, Leahy had to try.
Henry H. Adams, Witness to Power: The Life of Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy (1985), p. 238
Looks like a king in exile.
From one of de Gaulle's instructors at the cole de Guerre in Paris, as quoted by The Atlantic , November 1960
During his stay in London King was presented to King George VI at Buckingham Palace. His Majesty, wearing the uniform of an admiral of the fleet, received King in a sitting room where he was at work on papers. Whiskey or tea was offered, and as King had given up spirits for the duration of the war, he gladly accepted the tea, which was ready. The King reminisced agreeably about his cruises in the Royal Navy, and asked the admiral about his own with such tact that the audience, in retrospect, resembled a chat between a couple of old sailors. None of this comfortable atmosphere prevailed when General de Gaulle called at Claridge's to pay his respects to King and Marshall. Stark, who throughout the war skillfully conducted many negotiations with the Free French, had arranged the meeting. De Gaulle, feeling himself to the the head of a state, seemingly considered that he should be called upon, but as it had been pointed out that he had two stars, while Marshall and King had four, he presented himself at Claridge's, although with rather ill grace. He appeared at the proper time with a single aide, but conducted himself very stiffly, and after delivering himself of a long speech in French, in which he asked for many things that we needed ourselves at that moment, took his departure. It was scarcely a call calculated to make friends!
Ernest King and Walter M. Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record (1952), p. 405-406
In the course of the Casablanca Conference, General de Gaulle, who was in London, had been invited by the Prime Minister to come to North Africa. De Gaulle was offended that he had not been invited further in advance, and in one way and another proved to be his usual difficult self. Mr. Eden, the Foreign Secretary, had to exert great pressure to induce him to leave London for Casablanca. When he arrived there the firmest treatment by Mr. Churchill was required to persuade him to call upon Giraud. Finally in the interests of at least good public feeling a 'shot-gun marriage' was arranged. At a press conference on 24 January, De Gaulle and Giraud were made to sit in a row of chairs, alternating with Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, and to be photographed shaking hands. As the newsreel cameras finished their work, each French general dropped the other's hand as though it were red hot.
Ernest J. King and Walter M. Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record (1952), p. 425
Prior to the landings De Gaulle had made it clear that he wished to be definitely recognized as the ruler of France, and claimed that he alone had the right to give orders to the people of France. Once the landings had taken place these difficulties did not diminish, and the Joint Chiefs during their stay in England had a taste of these complications when De Gaulle undertook to change the regulations about the use of United States currency in France by American troops. The Joint Chiefs sent General Koenig, who, as the commander of the French forces of the interior, was serving as a direct subordinate of Eisenhower's in the Allied organization, and asked him what the difficulty was. It appeared that Koenig could not see De Gaulle's point either. As Eisenhower was troubled about the correct manner of managing civilian affairs in France until a proper organization could be set up, he asked the Joint Chiefs what to do, and they proposed that he at once send a message to the President, suggesting that if De Gaulle would not cooperate properly, another Frenchman be designated to manage French civilian affairs, and that De Gaulle be ignored, entirely. The Joint Chiefs did not stay to hear the answer from the President, but later that evening they received word that he had concurred.
Ernest J. King and Walter M. Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record (1952), p. 551
His determination to go his own way, his insistence on informing himself through his own idiosyncratic avenues of communication, his deliberate short-circuiting of the proper channels of responsibility- all these had defects of their virtues that now and then led him and the country astray. His two great failures were France and China. These historic civilizations of depth and pungent flavor, to which he was instinctively and without reluctance attracted, defeated his best efforts to incorporate them in an all-embracing view of the postwar world. In each instance he was badly advised, and there is no great artfulness needed to see where the bad advice came from and why he listened to it. But evidence was also available to him that de Gaulle was a far more powerful personage than he had imagined and Chiang Kai-shek was a far weaker one: he chose not to act on it. He wanted a revived but malleable France that would be willing to give up its empire and a united but nationalist China that would be a 'great nation,' able to fill the vacuum left by Japanese defeat. He got neither.
Eric Larrabee, Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War (1987), p. 12-13
When he was appointed to command the North African expedition, Eisenhower was briefed by Robert Murphy, our diplomatic representative there, on the 'bewildering complexities' of the quarrels among not only the French factions but Spanish, Arab, Berber, German, and Russian as well. 'Eisenhower listened with a kind of horrified fascination,' wrote Murphy, 'to my description of the possible complications... The General seemed to sense that this first campaign would present him with problems running the entire geopolitical gamut- it certainly did.' What he could not have realized was that it would also place him in the crossfire between two towering political personalities, Franklin Roosevelt and Charles de Gaulle.
Eric Larrabee, Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War (1987), p. 421
Present at Casablanca but excluded from every talk that mattered was Charles de Gaulle. No one seemed to know quite what to do with him. But before the conference was over, his differences with the Allies had been patched up somewhat, and his future role had been much clarified.
C.L. Sulzberger, in his book The American Heritage Picture History of World War II (1966), p. 317 Wikipedia has an article about: Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Wikisource has original works written by or about: Retrieved from 'https://en.wikiquote.org/w/index.php?title=Charles_de_Gaulleoldid=2901561' Charles de Gaulle
Charles de Gaulle (1890-1970) was the dominant military and political leader of France, 1940-1969. He was a conservative in the traditionalist sense, and helped restore the leadership of conservatives and Catholics while weakening the Communists and socialists.
He was an outspoken critic of President Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam war policy, [1] America's Two China policy, [2] and America's failure to recognize the Sino-Soviet split, a division within the communist bloc. [3] For these reasons he pulled France out of the NATO military command, while maintaining political ties with the alliance.
Fleeing the victorious German invaders in 1940, he rejected the new Vichy regime that allied itself to Germany. Gnral de Gaulle set up his base in London, proclaimed himself the incarnation of France, created the Free French movement with British funding, rallied some of the oversees colonies (especially in Africa), organized a French non-Communist anti-fascist Resistance movement, and tried, but failed, to gain full recognition from the British and Americans. A firm proponent of democracy, he destroyed the vestiges of the collaborationist Vichy regime. He retired from office in 1946, but returned in 1958 as France verged on civil war over the Algeria crisis. As president (195869) during the Fifth Republic, he revised the constitution to provide for presidential control of foreign and military policy, granted independence to Algeria and the African colonies, and restored the nation's economic health. Forging a close bond with Germany, he sought to dominate the European Common Market by vetoing British entry and holding the U.S. at arms length. Exhausted politically and emotionally, he finally left office in 1969. His reputation as the strongest and greatest of French leaders since Napoleon continues into the 21st century.
4 Fifth Republic: 1958-1969
4.1 1958 crisis
4.2 Domestic politics
4.3 Foreign policy
6 Notable Quotes
8 Detailed bibliography
8.6 Primary sources Career
De Gaulle was born in Lille on November 22, 1890. His family moved to Paris in 1895, where his father became professor of philosophy in the Jesuit College of Paris. The father inculcated the son with a profound belief in the glory of traditional Catholic France. Charles received a rigorous classical education that included a year 1907-08 at a Jesuit college in Belgium. He matriculated at the Saint Cyr military academy in 1908; in 1911 he was commissioned in the French army.
At the battle of Douaumont in the Verdun campaign in FebruaryMarch 1916 Captain de Gaulle led the 10th Battalion of the 33d Infantry Regiment; he was then assigned to relieve the 110th Regiment from its position at the Verdun front. On 2 March 1916 his company came under attack from the Germans and despite his much praised bravery, he was badly injured and was captured, spending 32 months in a prisoner of war camp.
After the war France set up a military mission to support newly independent Poland by advising and training its army. In 1919, Captain de Gaulle volunteered for service in Poland and spent a year teaching at the Infantry School of the Polish army; he became strategic adviser to Polish general Edward Rydz-Smigly when France decided to actively aid the Polish counterattack against Russia. Back in France he taught military history at Saint Cyr, served as aide to Marshal Henri Philippe Ptain, and wrote several books on military strategy. His book The Army of the Future (1934), daringly proposed mechanization of the infantry, with stress on the wholesale use of tanks. Ironically the German panzer units, so effectively employed in the invasion of France in 1940, utilized similar theories, while the French dispersed and wasted their armor. As the French armies collapsed in spring 1940 de Gaulle was made brigadier general [4] and then undersecretary of war in Paul Reynaud's cabinet. The elderly Marshal Ptain now came to power in a regime headquartered in the resort town of Vichy. Ptain, venerated as the great hero of World War I, not only admitted defeat but accepted the idea of permanent subordination to Germany. Ptain wanted France to be welcomed by Berlin as the most useful and collaborationist of the nations of Europe, which he thought Germany would long control. French National Committee See also: French National Committee
De Gaulle refused to accept defeat and subservience to Germany. Resistance was possible because the air force and navy were intact (some of the French Navy 'surrendered' to Britain, the remainder the British bombed), as was the entire overseas empire; Churchill offered assistance and increasingly so too did Franklin Roosevelt. As Ptain's new Vichy government prepared to sign a humiliating armistice on 22 June 1940, de Gaulle deserted his post as Defense Minister and flew to London and on 18 June in disobedience of orders. As a rebel he issued his famous 'Apple,' proclaiming 'France has lost a battle, but France has not lost the war!' and calling French patriots to resistance. [5] De Gaulle's forces by November 1940, numbered 35,000 troops and twenty warships; several overseas colonies including Syria had rallied to his banner, although his forces were defeated in September in an attempt, with British aid, to seize Dakar, Senegal.
In London in Sept. 1941 de Gaulle formed the free French National Council, with himself as president. It was an all-encompassing coalition of exhilees, ranging from conservative Catholics like himself to Communists. [6] By early 1942, the 'Fighting French' movement, as it was now called, gained rapidly in power and influence; it overcame Vichy in Syria and Lebanon, adding to its base. In November 1942 the Americans invaded French North Africa. They favored General Henri Giraud, the High Commissioner of North Africa. But de Gaulle seized power from Giraud, who resigned in late 1942. De Gaulle took supreme command of all French forces in April 1944. Meanwhile, all the French colonies except Japanese-occupied Indochina came under Gaullist control, as did Corsica. Although Churchill was vacillating, his top aide Anthony Eden was a strong supporter of de Gaulle. De Gaulle's repeated protests against all violations of French sovereignty, real or imagined, irked the Americans and were largely ignored by the British. His imperial personality and humorless demands especially annoyed President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
De Gaulle in turn was exasperated at the Americans, who were more willing to work with Vichy or Giraud than with him: The United States, delighting in her resources, feeling that she no longer had within herself sufficient scope for her energies, wishing to help those who were in misery or bondage the world over, yielded in her turn to that taste for intervention in which the instinct for domination cloaked itself. [7]
It turn Franklin D. Roosevelt distrusted him. De Gaulle removed French forces from the planned invasion of Normandy in June 1944. He was not at D-Day and was excluded from all the top-level conferences. The British and American, gave his regime de jure recognition and allowed his armies to enter France and to be the first to enter Paris after the Germans fled in August 1944. French armies, 1.3 million strong, under de Gaulle as provisional president, thereupon fought alongside the British and Americans. To Stalin's intense anger, France was given an occupation zone in Germany, and a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, with a veto. The origins of the Cold War dates from these events. [8] Fourth Republic: 1945-1958
As the war ended the Resistance coalition fell apart. De Gaulle's advocacy of a strong executive power was rejected by the voters, who in late 1945 adopted a constitution for the Fourth Republic that resembled that of the discredited Third Republic. De Gaulle resigned the provisional presidency in January 1946, saying that he did not wish 'to preside, powerless, over the powerlessness of the state.' In 1947 he resigned all his offices, refusing to be a candidate in the presidential election. 'How can anyone govern a nation that has two hundred and forty-six different kinds of cheese?', he quipped. [9] In retirement at the village of Colombey-les-Deux-glises, he created a new conservative party, RPF, Rassemblement du Peuple Franais (Rally of the French People), which only lasted until 1953. He then focused on his great war memoirs, L'Appel (1954) (translated into English as 'The Call to Honor,' 1955); L'Unit, (1956) (translated as Unity , 1959); and Le Salut , (1959) (translated as 'Salvation', 1960). Fifth Republic: 1958-1969 1958 crisis
For four years France had fought a civil war in Algeria against the FLN, which demanded independence. The Frenchmen who lived in Algeria, their allies among the Arabs, and powerful elements of the military inside France, rejected the FLN and demanded that Algeria remain integrated into France. They insisted so vehemently they were prepared to overthrow the government in Paris if it wavered.
In May, 1958, Frenchmen in Algeria revolted, throwing France into turmoil that verged on civil war. Rebels comprised young nationalists, supported by the large planters, army officers, and other proponents of integration of the Muslim population with France, feared a new government in Paris would make concessions to the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). The rebels proclaimed a committee of public safety; the revolt spread to Corsica. In Paris the National Assembly voted emergency powers to newly elected Premier Pierre Pflimlin. However, only de Gaulle could solve the crisis, for he had the support of the navy, the police, and such prominent politicians as Socialist Guy Mollet and Moderate Republican chief Georges Bidault. Pflimlin resigned and President Ren Coty summoned de Gaulle as prime minister. The National Assembly, under threat that parachutists would seize Paris if it refused, voted 329-224 to invest de Gaulle with extraordinary powers for six months beginning June 1, 1958; the National Assembly then went home and de Gaulle took charge. When a new constitution took effect, he became the president of the Fifth Republic. Interpretations
These uprisings provided the long-awaited chance to supporters of Gnral de Gaulle, who sought a new regime in which the executive power would be strengthened. Underlying the views of Gaullists such as Jacques Soustelle, Michel Debr, and Jacques Chaban-Delmas was a faith in French grandeur, a new nationalism which transformed itself into a desire for order and maintenance of the French Empire. These interests momentarily coincided with those of the Algerian rebels who feared Anglo-American mediation of the Algerian rebellion.
Gaullists have seen this critical episode as the result of the preplanned statesmanship of de Gaulle. Their 'grand design' thesis includes three key arguments. First is the claim that de Gaulle decided to give up Algeria because he concluded that keeping in the face of a widespread popular anti-French revolt was too costly economically and against France's ideal policy of a focus on Europe. Second, Gaullists argue his general objective ending the Algerian burden was planned well before his return to power in 1958. Third they claim that what seemed an erratic, slow, and indecisive progress toward Algerian independence was in reality de Gaulle's well-orchestrated, consistent, and deceptive policy calculated to overcome the sentiments of the French people toward Algeria. [10]
Other historians argue that the Gnral had no long-term plan, and probably did not want independence for Algeria. Thus French scholars Raoul Girardet and Jacques Julliard argue de Gaulle's Algerian policy was a set of unanticipated concessions imposed by events. They have an alternative 'juggler' thesis that does not attribute harmony or continuity to de Gaulle's policy, nor does it try to explain the lack of discernible consistency in the policy by attributing cunning Machiavelism to de Gaulle. Instead it considers the policy as the result of an erratic improvisation. [11] Merom says Algeria was not doomed by the economic realities because the cost was tolerablebetween 50 to 60 of the defense budget, or 10 to 15 percent of the total budget in Paris. White the French indeed hads a severe budget crisis verging on bankruptcy, Algeria was only a small part of it. More important was spending on infrastructure renovation, industrial and agricultural modernization, nuclear energy, and expansion of education, and welfare entitlements. On the other hand, military spending was helping the economy. Two years into de Gaulle's new regime, the financial crisis was over and the economy was in fine shape, notes Merom.
Merom says the second argument, that de Gaulle's policy was slow, gradual, and deceptive because he had to overcome a strong public sentiment in favor of keeping Algeria, is likewise invalid according to public opinion polls. They show opinion was evenly split; indeed, over 40 of the French people were alienated from core ideas of the old policy of no-recognition, no-negotiations, and no-compromise with the Arab rebels of the FLN. De Gaulle's policy of negotiation had a firm grounding in public opinion, though not a clear majority.
Merom agrees that de Gaulle's domineering manner and decisive style, the constitutional power he skillfully amassed as President of the Fifth Republic, his reputation as France's wartime savior, and the confidence vested in him by the people and the military, were indispensable qualities for a leader who wished to lead France out of Algeria. Merom concludes that his basic objective in Algeria was moderately conservative. He disliked the harsh military tactics in use and wanted more collaborative relations between France and the Arabs, but he did not want Algeria to become independent. Only when he realized his goals were impossible, Merom argues, did he start to compromise. Even then he tried to preserve as many French interests in Algeria as possible. By 1960, after suppressing another revolt, restoring the health of the national economy, and seeing his army drive the FLN almost to extinction, he realized the only long-term solution was a genuine Algerian independence, and he negotiated it. [12] Domestic politics
In 1958-59 de Gaulle concentrated on political reform, a new the constitution for the Fifth Republic, financial reform, economic recovery, and search for a solution to the Algerian question. A new constitution that gave the president control of foreign and military policy was adopted in a referendum on Sept. 28, 1958. At last executive power stood above legislative authority. President de Gaulle, inaugurated on Jan. 8, 1959, could rule by decree in emergency, appoint ministers without responsibility to the legislature, and dissolve the legislature whose regular sessions were reduced to five months per year. Economy
De Gaulle's financial and economic program reflected his desire for stability, industrial expansion, and the need to prepare France for membership in the European Common Market. He devalued the franc to 492 to the dollar, raised taxes on high incomes, wines, liquors, and tobacco, and reduced pensions and subsidies. A new franc, at 5 per U.S. dollar, facilitated commercial transactions and international trade; it remained strong. He undertook a 25 increase in state investment in modernizing industry. By mid-1960 the French economy was in better shape than at any time since 1914. Algeria
Against the unyielding Algerian Arab revolution De Gaulle made only slow progress. His middle course between independence and continued colonial status cost him support among those groups that helped to bring him to power, the European settler community and the army. In September 1959, the Gnral offered Algeria a three-way choice between integration with France, autonomy, and independence. The settlers counterattacked with another uprising in January 1960, which failed to overthrow De Gaulle. In response, de Gaulle assumed extraordinary powers, restored order, and replaced ranking officers in Algeria with Gaullist or apolitical officers. This purge proved insufficient, for in April 1961 some military officers engineered an abortive coup. He once again assumed extraordinary powers and systematically removed disloyal elements from the army command.
Finally the president decided to grant Algerian independence and end the cancer once and for all. Mutual concessions were made and the Evian Accords on Mar. 18, 1962 began a cease-fire with the FLN forces. There emerged an independent Algeria, closely associated with France; in return for certain guarantees for settlers and economic privileges, continued French aid was promised. Large numbers of Algerian Arabs, who had supported Paris, fled to France, and many settlers did so also.
At the same time France gave independence to most of its overseas colonies, although tying them closely to France with economic and military pacts.
Foreign policy Charles De Gaulle Objectives
Restoring French greatness was his highest priority. That required a strong army, rockets and a space program, and especially nuclear weapons, explaining, 'No country without an atom bomb could properly consider itself independent.' [13]
After a landslide victoiry in parliamentary election in 1962, De Gaulle turned to foreign policy. He held that Western Europe as a whole, with France in the lead, should follow an independent military and economic path, separate specifically from that of the United States and Britain, both of which he distrusted. De Gaulle held that American nuclear weapons in Europe made the area more susceptible to Soviet attack, and he doubted any guarantees that the U.S. would defend Europe. Economically, de Gaulle pressed for the return to the gold standard in international trade and the rejection of sterling and the dollar as reserve currencies, especially because both the U.S. and the British economies suffered severe balance of payments deficits. Common Market
De Gaulle vetoed Britain's application to join the Common Market (European Economic Community or EEC, a forerunner of the European Union) in 1963, saying he wanted to avoid a loss of cohesion in the organization and to keep it from becoming a dominion of the United States. He said Britain was not sufficiently European and its entry into the EEC would make the EEC too dependent on the United States. De Gaulle blocked a second petition by Britain in 1967. Britain was finally admitted after de Gaulle's death. Analysts emphasized that de Gaulle saw Britain as insular and maritime rather than continental. De Gaulle was suspicious of British intentions in Europe, yet he admired Britain's political stability and past accomplishments. One military factor in de Gaulle's opposition was Britain's deal with the U.S. through NATO involving Polaris nuclear missile technology. De Gaulle wanted a strong Europe free of any dependence on the United States, while British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan felt Britain's 'special relationship' with the United States more important to its future. [14] Military policy
During the Berlin crisis from 1958 to 1962. De Gaulle took advantage to create an independent force de frappethat is, nuclear weapons and bombersin order to reassert France's role as a powerful world leader. De Gaulle enthusiastically supported American General Lauris Norstad's proposal in 1959 to establish a top secret quadripartite Allied military planning group (LIVE OAK), hoping that it would strengthen France's position and weaken US domination of NATO. De Gaulle created a bilateral alliance with West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer, which tended to upset the delicate diplomatic balance of NATO. His supporters rationalized France's cavalier position by arguing that independent French nuclear capability would provide a second center of deterrence against the Soviet Union.
De Gaulle forced a serious clash with Britain regarding the NATO alliance. By opposing British attempts to incorporate Europe in a broader transatlantic economic, political, and military alliance, de Gaulle hoped to create a chance for France to become what she ceased to be since Waterloo; the first in the world through driving a wedge between Europe, on one hand, and Britain and the United States on the other. Initially successful in isolating Britain, particularly through France's veto power over the European Economic Community (EEC), de Gaulle sought to further his country's status through a critique of, and withdrawal from, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The move backfired, however, allowing British foreign policy to isolate France and de Gaulle, hold NATO together, and eventually led to British inclusion in the EEC by other European members to counter France's disruptive behavior. In 1967, as in 1961-63, the French were determined to preserve their position of leadership within the EEC, and this was the reason for de Gaulle's second veto of Britain's application for membership. French diplomacy was based on the need to preserve the Community of Six while barring Britain. Although France succeeded in excluding Britain in the short term, in the longer term the French had to adjust their stance on enlargement in order to retain influence. Leadership within the community was the foundation of France's international status. [15]
In 1966 de Gaulle's decision to withdraw French forces from NATO (but to remain nominally a member) paradoxically reinforced the cohesion of NATO, leaving the U.S. wholly dominant in the organization. Meanwhile, he rebuilt the French army, restoring morale giving it a new and modern role in the economy and foreign affairs.
His continued deprecations of American involvement in Vietnam and his outspoken support of French-Canadian separatists in Quebec alienated opinion in the U.S. and Canada. Departure
De Gaulle was reelected president for seven years by a small margin in 1965, and in 1967 elections his allies won a slimmest majority in the National Assembly. Then, in May 1968, opposition to De Gaulle suddenly crystallized. It was an age of wortldwide student demonstrations, nowhere more serious than in France. [16] Student demonstrations against the government and labor union strikes coalesced to produce a nationwide strike and unrest that very nearly brought the government down. At a critical point the Gnral disappeared for 24 hours. He was not hiding; rather he was negotiating for army support to retake Paris in case the rebels seized the city. With the army's backing, de Gaulle confidently returned, rallied the conservative middle class, and called immediate elections. Taking a vigorous part in the campaign, De Gaulle defined the issue as a choice between himself and the Communists. Repelled by the violence and disorder, the French electorate returned the Gaullists to power with a large majority in the assembly.
De Gaulle's unexpected loss of power in 1969 was psychological for his temperament was marked by the awareness of national and personal greatness as well as the realization of his old age and failing health. Secondly it was personal regarding Georges Pompidou because de Gaulle could brook no rival and his initially self-effacing prime minister had grown so powerful that the Gnral replaced him in 1968 with Maurice Couve de Murville. It was constitutional, for de Gaulle's reliance on a referendum of 27 April 1969 regarding relatively minor issues of regionalization and senate reform was defeated at the polls by 53-47. The Gnral seized the opportunity and resigned for good the next day. He was succeeded by Pompidou, who won 58 of the vote by proclaiming himself de Gaulle's heir. [17] Ideas and and memory
The image of de Gaulle in France today is a great national heroindeed a saviorhonored by all parties. His vision of the grandeur of France is the national vision. [18]
De Gaulle's political philosophy, with its use of concepts such as lan, will, instinct, heroism, and participation, reflected the influences of Charles Pguy (1873-1914), Maurice Barrs (1862-1923), and Henri Bergson (1859-1941). Portier (1997) finds that de Gaulle's central principles derived from his religious devotion to Catholicism. Some scholars have suggested that De Gaulle modeled his authoritarian approach on the political theories of Machiavelli, Maurras, and Napoleon, yet the French president's regard for the sovereignty of the state undermines all such theories. A close comparison of the papal encyclicals of Paul VI, Pius XI, John XXIII, and Pius XII with De Gaulle's own writings reveals the statesman's close alliance with the political position of the Vatican. Portier concludes that Gaullism is not a rigid authoritarianism; rather it is a profound concern for social justice, a belief in the primacy of central authority in conjunction with intermediary legislative bodies, and respect for popular consensus. [19]
Kuisel (1992) asks whether de Gaulle was 'Anti-American,' and answers yes, for the Gnral consistently and mightily struggled to upend an international order built by and for America. He attacked America's arrogance of power and led his nation toward a less cooperative posture toward Washington. Indeed, he incited expressions of anti-Americanism among the French and deep down he shared a stereotype common among French intellectuals of American society as soulless, materialist, and ahistorical. [20] Notable Quotes Faced with crisis, the man of character falls back on himself. He imposes his own stamp of action, takes responsibility for it, makes it his own. [21] How can you govern a country with 365 varieties of cheese? [22] France has lost a battle. But France has not lost the war! [23] You start out giving your hat, then you give your coat, then your shirt, then your skin and finally your soul. (On dealing with the Soviet Union) [24] You may be sure that the Americans will commit all the stupidities they can think of, plus some that are beyond imagination. (On U.S. entry into the Vietnam War) [25] Charles De Gaulle Departures Quotes about de Gaulle The hardest cross I have to bear is the Cross of Lorraine. attributed, falsely, to Winston Churchill (it was really uttered by Churchill's envoy to France) [26]
Further reading
Berstein, Serge, and Peter Morris. The Republic of de Gaulle 1958-1969 (The Cambridge History of Modern France) (2006) excerpt and text search
Cogan, Charles. Charles de Gaulle: A Brief Biography with Documents. (1995). 243 pp.
De Gaulle, Charles. The Complete War Memoirs of Charles De Gaulle (1998) 1048pp; excerpt and text search
Lacouture, Jean. De Gaulle: The Rebel 1890-1944 (1984; English ed. 1991), 640pp; excerpt and text search; vol 2. De Gaulle: The Ruler 1945-1970 (1993), 700pp, The standard scholarly biography,
Kolodziej, Edward A. French International Policy under de Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur (1974) online edition
Ledwidge, Bernard. De Gaulle (1982),
Shennan, Andrew. De Gaulle (1993) 200pp
Williams, Charles. The Last Great Frenchman: A Life of General De Gaulle (1997), 560pp excerpt and text search
Williams, Philip M. and Martin Harrison. De Gaulle's Republic (1965) online edition
Detailed bibliography Biographies
Cogan, Charles. Charles de Gaulle: A Brief Biography with Documents. (1995). 243 pp.
Lacouture, Jean. De Gaulle: The Rebel 1890-1944 (1984; English ed. 1991), 640pp; excerpt and text search; vol 2. De Gaulle: The Ruler 1945-1970 (1993), 700pp, The standard scholarly biography, based on hundreds of interviews.
Ledwidge, Bernard. De Gaulle (1982),
Shennan, Andrew. De Gaulle (1993) 200pp
Williams, Charles. The Last Great Frenchman: A Life of General De Gaulle (1997), 560pp excerpt and text search Politics
Berstein, Serge, and Peter Morris. The Republic of de Gaulle 1958-1969 (The Cambridge History of Modern France) (2006) excerpt and text search
Cameron, David R. and Hofferbert, Richard I. 'Continuity and Change in Gaullism: the General's Legacy.' American Journal of Political Science 1973 17(1): 77-98. Issn: 0092-5853, a statistcial analysis of the Gaullist voting coalition in elections 1958-73 Fulltext: Abstract in Jstor
Cogan, Charles G. 'The Break-up: General de Gaulle's Separation from Power,' Journal of Contemporary History Vol. 27, No. 1 (Jan., 1992), pp. 167199, re: 1969 in JSTOR
Furniss,Edgar J., Jr. De Gaulle and the French Army. (1964)
Gough, Hugh and Horne, John, eds. De Gaulle and Twentieth-Century France. (1994). 158 pp. essays by experts
Hauss, Charles. Politics in Gaullist France: Coping with Chaos (1991) online edition
Hoffmann, Stanley. Decline or Renewal? France since the 1930s (1974) online edition
Jackson, Julian. 'General de Gaulle and His Enemies: Anti-Gaullism in France Since 1940,' Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 6th Ser., Vol. 9 (1999), pp. 4365 in JSTOR
Merom, Gil. 'A 'Grand Design'? Charles de Gaulle and the End of the Algerian War,' Armed Forces Society (1999), Vol. 25, Issue 2; in EBSCO
Northcutt, Wayne. Historical Dictionary of the French Fourth and Fifth Republics, 1946-1991 (1992)
Pierce, Roy, 'De Gaulle and the RPF--A Post-Mortem,' The Journal of Politics Vol. 16, No. 1 (Feb., 1954), pp. 96119 in JSTOR
Rioux, Jean-Pierre, and Godfrey Rogers. The Fourth Republic, 1944-1958 (The Cambridge History of Modern France) (1989)
Shepard, Todd. The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France. (2006). 288 pp.
Williams, Philip M. and Martin Harrison. De Gaulle's Republic (1965) online edition Foreign policy
Bozo, Frdric. Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States and the Atlantic Alliance (2000)
Kolodziej, Edward A. French International Policy under de Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur (1974) online edition
Logevall, Fredrik. 'De Gaulle, Neutralization, and American Involvement in Vietnam, 1963-1964,' The Pacific Historical Review Vol. 61, No. 1 (Feb., 1992), pp. 69102 in JSTOR
Mahan, E. Kennedy, De Gaulle and Western Europe. (2002). 229 pp.
Mangold, Peter. The Almost Impossible Ally: Harold Macmillan and Charles de Gaulle. (2006). 275 pp.
Paxton, Robert O. and Wahl, Nicholas, eds. De Gaulle and the United States: A Centennial Reassessment. (1994). 433 pp.
Pratt, Julius W. 'De Gaulle and the United States: How the Rift Began,' The History Teacher Vol. 1, No. 4 (May, 1968), pp. 515 in JSTOR
Vasse, Maurice. La Grandeur: Politique Etrangre du Gnral de Gaulle, 1958-1969 (1997)
Varat, Benjamin E. 'A Clash of Kings: De Gaulle, Kennedy, and the Battle for Western Europe, 1958-1963.' PhD dissertation Boston U. 2006. 356 pp. DAI 2006 67(1): 295-A. DA3202578 Fulltext: ProQuest Dissertations Theses
White, Dorothy Shipley. Black Africa and de Gaulle: From the French Empire to Independence. (1979). 314 pp. Ideas and memory
Cerny, Philip G. The Politics of Grandeur: Ideological Aspects of de Gaulle's Foreign Policy. (1980). 319 pp.
Clague, Monique. 'Conceptions of Leadership: Charles de Gaulle and Max Weber,' Political Theory Vol. 3, No. 4 (Nov., 1975), pp. 423440 in JSTOR
Gordon, Philip H. A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy (1993) online edition
Hoffmann, Stanley. 'The Hero as History: De Gaulle's War Memoirs' in Hoffman Decline or Renewal? France since the 1930s (1974) pp 187201 online edition
Johnson, Douglas. 'The Political Principles of General de Gaulle,' International Affairs Vol. 41, No. 4 (Oct., 1965), pp. 650662 in JSTOR
Mahoney, Daniel J. De Gaulle: Statesmanship, Grandeur, and Modern Democracy. (1996). 188 pp. intellectual history
Mahoney, Daniel J. 'A 'Man of Character': The Statesmanship of Charles de Gaulle,' Polity Vol. 27, No. 1 (Autumn, 1994), pp. 157173 in JSTOR
Pedley, Alan. As Mighty as the Sword: A Study of the Writings of Charles de Gaulle (1996) 226pp World War II Charles De Gaulle Definition
Berthon, Simon. Allies at War: The Bitter Rivalry among Churchill, Roosevelt, and de Gaulle. (2001). 356 pp.
Funk, Arthur Layton. Charles de Gaulle: The Crucial Years, 1943-1944 (1959) online edition
Kersaudy, Francois. Churchill and De Gaulle (2nd ed 1990) 482pp
Rossi, Mario. 'United States Military Authorities and Free France, 1942-1944,' The Journal of Military History Vol. 61, No. 1 (Jan., 1997), pp. 4964 in JSTOR
Weinberg, Gerhard L. Visions of Victory: The Hopes of Eight World War II Leaders. (2005). 292 pp. chapter on de Gaulle Primary sources
De Gaulle, Charles. The Complete War Memoirs of Charles De Gaulle (1998) 1048pp; excerpt and text search
De Gaulle, Charles. Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor (1971)
De Gaulle, Charles. The Enemy's House Divided (2002), translation of La Discorde chez l'ennemi (1924), analysis of Germany's mistakes in World War I notes
https://academic.oup.com/dh/article-abstract/31/5/909/368115/Reexamining-de-Gaulle-s-Peace-Initiative-on-the?redirectedFrom=fulltext
Richard Nixon credits De Gaulle as the first urging him to seek raprochament with the People's Republic of Chinahttps://www.nixonfoundation.org/2014/03/nixon-de-gaulle/
[1]
He wore his uniform with the one-star insignia of a brigadier general for the remainder of his life.
Jean-Louis Cremieux-Brilhac, La France Libre de l'appel du 18 juin a la Liberation (Paris: Gallimard, 1996)
The Communists were controlled by Moscow, which was allied with Germany in 1940. They came into opposition only when Germany invaded Russia in June 1941. De Gaulle's policy became one of friendship directly with Moscow.
The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, (1959) vol. 2, p. 88
https://archive.org/details/rooseveltandhopk006306mbp
Quoted in Newsweek (Oct. 1, 1962)
Gil Meriam, 'A 'Grand Design'? Charles de Gaulle and the End of the Algerian War,' Armed Forces Society (1999); De Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope (1971) p. 84; Philip G. Cerny, The Politics of Grandeur (1980), pp 61, 145; Bernard Ledwidge, De Gaulle (1982), pp 244-45, 257; Philip M. Williams, Politics and Society in de Gaulle's Republic (1971), p. 28.
Gil Merom, 'A 'Grand Design'? Charles de Gaulle and the End of the Algerian War,' Armed Forces Society (1999)
Gil Merom, 'A 'Grand Design'? Charles de Gaulle and the End of the Algerian War,' Armed Forces Society (1999)
Quoted in New York Times Magazine (May 12, 1968)
Richard Davis, 'Why Did the General Do It?' De Gaulle, Polaris and the French Veto of Britain's Application to Join the Common Market.' European History Quarterly 1998 28(3): 373-397. Issn: 0265-6914 Fulltext: Ebsco
James Ellison, 'Separated by the Atlantic: the British and De Gaulle, 1958-1967.' Diplomacy Statecraft 2006 17(4): 853-870. Issn: 0959-2296 Fulltext: Ebsco; Helen Parr, 'Saving the Community: the French Response to Britain's Second EEC Application in 1967.' Cold War History 2006 6(4): 425-454. Issn: 1468-2745 Fulltext: Ebsco
Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente (2003); Stanley Hoffmann, 'Confrontation in May 1968,' Decline or Renewal? France since the 1930s (1974) pp 145-86.
Charles G. Cogan, 'The Break-up: General de Gaulle's Separation from Power' Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 27, No. 1. (Jan., 1992), pp. 167-199
Daniel J. Mahoney, 'A 'Man of Character': The Statesmanship of Charles de Gaulle,' Polity Vol. 27, No. 1 (1994), pp. 157-173
Philippe Portier, 'Le General De Gaulle et Le Catholicisme: Pour Une Autre Interpretation De La Pensee Gaullienne,' [General De Gaulle and Catholicism: Regarding Another Interpretation of Gaullist Thought]. Revue Historique 1997 297(2): 533-562. Issn: 0035-3264
Richard F. Kuisel, 'Was De Gaulle Anti-American?' Tocqueville Review 1992 13(1): 21-32. Issn: 0730-479x
[2] Quotatio - Charles De Gaulle
[3] Quotatio - Charles De Gaulle
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http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=112 See also
Charles De Gaulle Presidency Presidents of France Charles de Gaulle Georges Pompidou Valry Giscard dEstaing Franois Mitterrand Jacques Chirac Nicolas Sarkozy Franois Hollande Emmanuel Macron Charles De Gaulle French Retrieved from 'https://conservapedia.com/index.php?title=Charles_de_Gaulleoldid=1683320'
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